



Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law 
Antigua Universidad s/n - Apdo.28 20560 Oñati - Gipuzkoa – Spain 
Tel. (+34) 943 783064 
E: opo@iisj.es W: http://opo.iisj.net 1241 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, vol. 8, n. 9 (2018) – Feminist Judgments: Comparative Socio-Legal 
Perspectives on Judicial Decision Making and Gender Justice 
ISSN: 2079-5971 
Accessing Court Files as a Feminist Endeavour: Reflections  
on ‘Feminist Judgments of Aotearoa - Te Rino:  
A Two-Stranded Rope’ 
ELISABETH MCDONALD∗ 
PAULETTE BENTON-GREIG∗ 
McDonald, E. and Benton-Greig, P., 2018. Accessing Court Files as a Feminist Endeavour: 
Reflections on Feminist Judgments of Aotearoa-Te Rino: A Two-Stranded Rope. Oñati 
Socio-legal Series [online], 8 (9), 1241-1258. Received : 13-11-2017 ; Accepted : 04-05-
2018. Available from: https://doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-0997  
Abstract 
In this piece, we reflect on the significance of accessing court records for feminist 
endeavours. We discuss two examples that illustrate the value of accessing and 
critiquing court processes. Feminist judgment writing, as a feminist endeavour, 
demonstrates the significance of hearing women’s stories as well as the importance 
of nuanced factual analysis that takes account of the lived experiences of women. 
Access to the court file in one of the rewritten judgments exposed missing relevant 
facts in the appellate decision, and demonstrates how the appellant’s story was never 
fully reflected in the judgment or verdict. In our rape trial research, access to court 
records makes visible the complainant’s evidence and the response of the judge to 
her as a person. It also allows inquiry as to how the rules of evidence enacted for the 
protection of the complainant, such as non-disclosure of their occupation, are actually 
working in practice.  
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Resumen 
En este artículo, reflexionamos sobre el significado de acceder a archivos judiciales 
para objetivos feministas. Comentamos dos ejemplos que ilustran el valor de acceder 
a esos archivos y de criticar procesos judiciales. La redacción feminista de decisiones 
judiciales demuestra la importancia de escuchar los relatos de las mujeres, así como 
del análisis matizado de hechos que toma en consideración el relato de la experiencia 
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vivida por las mujeres. En uno de los fallos reescritos, el acceso al archivo judicial 
puso de manifiesto hechos relevantes ausentes en la decisión en apelación, y cómo 
el relato de la recurrente nunca llegó a reflejarse del todo en la sentencia. En nuestra 
investigación sobre juicios por violación, el acceso a los archivos hace visibles las 
pruebas de la denunciante y la respuesta que, como persona, le dio el juez. También 
permite cuestionar cómo se lleva a la práctica el reglamento probatorio dictado para 
proteger a la denunciante, como la no revelación de su profesión. 
Palabras clave 
Metodología feminista; sentencias feministas; proceso judicial por violación; acceso 
a archivos judiciales; mitología de la violación 
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1. Introduction 
Undertaking a feminist analysis of case law, whether of one case or a series, has 
been an oft-used method of exposing and questioning the premises on which 
decisions are based (see recently Fernando and Rundle 2016, Lammasniemi 2016, 
Capers 2017, D’Aoust 2017, Maxwell 2017, Mukhtar 2017). Such an endeavour can 
demonstrate gender bias as well as provide proposals for reform of law and practice. 
The task of reimagining a judgment from a feminist perspective, as done in the global 
feminist judgments project movement, is a more recent and similarly powerful 
method of demonstrating how judicial decision-making process may overlook, down-
play or unfairly dismiss the legitimate interests of women – whether in the particular 
decision or as a matter of precedent (Majury 2006, Hunter et al. 2010, Douglas et al. 
2014, Stanchi et al. 2016, Enright et al. 2017, McDonald et al. 2017). 
Most feminist case analysis is based on reported decisions or those available on legal 
or publically accessible websites, including sentencing notes and the judgments of 
appellate courts (see Hunter and Tyson 2017). Less work has been done through a 
systematic accessing of court files (but see Cunliffe 2007, Bell et al. 2013) in part 
because of the difficulty of identifying the relevant cases or because of the strictures 
in place regarding disclosure of court records to members of the public or 
researchers. Judicial control over court records, certainly in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
is seen as necessary given the amount of material on file that is of a confidential or 
privileged nature – much of which is either irrelevant to the (public) trial process or 
would be inadmissible in that forum.  
In this piece, we reflect on the significance of accessing court records for feminist 
endeavours – in particular, because of the ability to observe how decisions are made 
out of the public gaze. For example, pre-trial admissibility decisions (unless appealed) 
are often unreported and are not uploaded to legal databases. Material which 
provides the context for decisions about admissibility or the content of jury directions 
is also not usually available to researchers, and is only made visible by the extent to 
which it is referred to in what is published or otherwise in the public arena.  
Our interest in this research methodology, and our increased awareness of the 
richness of material contained in court records for feminist critical work, is due to our 
involvement in the feminist judgments project, but also because of our work on 
research into trial process in acquaintance rape cases. We begin this piece by 
discussing an example of the significance of accessing court records which occurred 
during the work on ko ngā muka o te rino (the threads of the two-stranded rope, 
McDonald et al. 2017), in the context of an appellate decision on the availability of 
self-defence to a woman who killed her abusive husband. We then outline the process 
of accessing the court files, including complainant evidence, in 30 New Zealand 
acquaintance rape trials, and make some observations about what this kind of access 
allows feminist researchers to notice and critique. 
2. Reimagining judgments and the significance of facts 
In Aotearoa New Zealand, as elsewhere, there is uncertainty about whether 
increasing the number of female judges makes any difference to the practice and 
substance of judicial decision making – in particular whether women judges make a 
difference to women’s experience of the law (see Schultz and Shaw 2013, Chan 
2014). Not all women are feminists and arguably a male judge could equally approach 
their task in a manner which is alive to potential gender issues, in the way they 
portray the story behind the case, the way they resolve a case and their awareness 
of the gendered impact of their decisions. The words of Reg Graycar are still 
disturbingly relevant nearly 20 years after she wrote them: 
I certainly believe it is essential we have more women judges, indeed that we have 
a more representative judiciary in all the respects that divide members of our 
community (e.g. racialisation, sexuality, physical ability, class). But in order for our 
perceptions of these core values of representativeness and impartiality to move with 
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the personnel, rather than remain fixed in the framework of a time when only a small 
part of the community was represented on courts, and legal doctrines and rules were 
framed from that partial perspective, we need to pay careful attention to judicial 
method and in particular to concepts such as judicial notice and ‘common sense’. In 
doing so, we need to focus just as much on the facts as we do on the law … [we 
need] to question and reformulate the rules of the game, rather than focus all our 
attention on the people being ‘let in’ to play. (Graycar 1998, pp. 20-21, emphasis 
added) 
To date, feminist engagement in Aotearoa aimed at reformulating the rules of the 
game has had mixed success. A number of the women lawyers associations have 
been influential – for example, acting as amicus in the benefit fraud case of Ruka v 
Department of Social Welfare [1997] (and see Stephens 2017), assisting the court 
to understand the impact of family violence on a relationship (Auckland Women 
Lawyers Association) and making a submission which convinced the Justice and 
Electoral Select Committee to introduce a total bar on offering evidence of a rape 
complainant’s reputation in sexual matters (Wellington Women Lawyers Association) 
(see McDonald 2007). However, most of the Law Commission’s proposals from the 
project on Women’s Access to Legal Services (Law Commission 1999b) and Te 
Tikanga o te Ture: Te Mātauranga o ngā Wāhine Māori e pa ana ki tēnei (Law 
Commission 1999a) or those from the work on Some Criminal Defences with 
Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (Law Commission 2001b), all projects 
undertaken in response to calls from the public, have not been implemented. The 
Law Commission has recently had to repeat their recommendations concerning the 
necessary reform of self-defence in Understanding Family Violence: Reforming the 
Criminal Law Relating to Homicide (Law Commission 2016), which have yet to be 
met with any substantive government response. 
One of the re-imagined judgments in the Te Rino volume is the Court of Appeal 
decision in R v Wang [1990] (Midson 2017, see also Kirkconnell-Kawana and Sharratt 
2017), a case which was the focus of both those Law Commission reports. The Court 
of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision that self-defence should not have been put 
to the jury. His decision included this somewhat infamous reasoning: 
The only view of the evidence open is that the accused was in no immediate danger. 
I accept that imminence of danger is a question of fact and degree and not a 
requirement of law. And further that a pre-emptive strike, even with a knife, may in 
particular circumstances qualify for consideration as self-defence. … Here there is no 
suggestion that the victim had a weapon, nor had made any move to suggest the 
intended use of any object as such. The contention on behalf of the defence has to 
go the length of asserting that a jury could reasonably find that an accused under no 
immediate threat or danger, however elastic an interpretation is given to that 
concept, who had alternative courses open none of which she had tried or seemingly 
considered, was or at least might reasonably be justified in deliberately killing the 
other party with a knife. To accede to that proposition in these circumstances would 
I think be close to a return to the law of the jungle. Giving the jury every latitude as 
to taking the most favourable view of the accused’s honest even if mistaken view of 
the circumstances, no jury could properly regard such a reaction by the accused to 
be a reasonable one. It is one of those cases, no doubt relatively rare, where I believe 
it would be impossible for the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt on the point. (R v 
Wang [1990], p. 535, emphases added) 
A number of feminist lawyers criticised the decision, on the basis that the Court 
showed no understanding of the position of victims of domestic abuse (Beri 1997, 
Seuffert 1997, Wright 1998). As one of those who entered this public debate 
(McDonald 1997a, 1997c), Elisabeth received a letter from (then) Eichelbaum CJ who 
wrote that it was not a case about battered woman’s syndrome, and said he had re-
looked at the file (indeed, including with the letter a copy of three of the pages of the 
trial transcript, highlighted, to support his position that the defendant suffered (only) 
from a depressive illness). It is certainly true that Wang [1990] has long been taught, 
and discussed, as a case of woman who was subjected to abuse by her husband, and 
killed him while he was intoxicated following threats to her and her family, who were 
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based in Hong Kong and vulnerable because of their political beliefs, that he promised 
to act on.  
The feminist judge and the commentators working on the case approached it in their 
first drafts as a case that did involve a battered woman, and one in which the trial 
judge and the Court of Appeal had demonstrated a lack of understanding about the 
dynamics of family violence, and the particular cultural context (the defendant was a 
Chinese immigrant woman). Cognisant of the different view held by the trial judge, 
during the first workshop (February 2016), Elisabeth suggested to those reimagining 
the decision and writing the commentary that it would be a valuable exercise to 
request access to the court file to see the notes of evidence first hand. 
As a powerful reminder of the importance of projects such as this, the notes of 
evidence disclosed much more violence than was reflected in the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment – the Court had referred to Mrs Wang’s experience of violence at the hands 
of Mr Li in one sentence: that it was a “loveless, coercive marriage” (R v Wang [1990], 
p. 540). The Court did not record the extent of the physical and psychological abuse 
meted out by the deceased over many years, which the commentators, after 
examining the case file, describe in this way: 
At trial, Mrs Wang described being married under duress: Mr Li stalked her, physically 
assaulted her and threatened to kill her family if she did not marry him. Their 
marriage in China was also characterised by physical and emotional abuse; numerous 
injuries left her hospitalised. When she left him and moved to Japan, he followed her, 
continued to threaten her, and forced her to remarry him. The abuse continued after 
they moved to New Zealand and their son was born. This abuse was rarely witnessed 
by others, including her sister, who had moved to New Zealand to help Mrs Wang at 
home. Some friends and associates testified that Mr Wang was dominating and 
insulted Mrs Wang in their presence, while others suggested that they did not take 
an interest in the nature of the couple’s relationship. On the rare occasions that Mrs 
Wang did disclose experiences of abuse and feelings of helplessness, friends testified 
that they had told Mrs Wang to endure it. Others witnessed Mr Wang make threats 
and imply, in Mrs Wang’s presence, that he could easily kill and dispose of a body in 
New Zealand (Kirkconnell-Kawana and Sharratt 2017) 
Nor did the appellate decision disclose that the deceased was scheduled to fly to Hong 
Kong, which is where the family members he threatened to blackmail and kill resided. 
As explained by the commentary, the notes of evidence also showed that on occasion 
Wang Xiao Jing (Mrs Wang) did indeed tell others about the abuse, and some friends 
had witnessed the threats as well as her husband’s claims that he would be able to 
carry out these threats and escape sanction. The Court of Appeal, however, discussed 
her situation in these ways: 
[I]t was not reasonable for the applicant in the circumstances as she believed them 
to be to kill her husband when alternative courses were open to her. Her sister and 
her friend Susan were both in the house. She could have woken them and sought 
their help and advice. She could have left the house taking her sister with her in the 
car which was available. She could have gone to acquaintances in Christchurch or to 
the police …  
In this case there was no immediacy to the threat to kill, it was part of blackmail to 
extort money, and, while the husband was in a drunken sleep, the immediate killing 
of the husband by his wife was not justified as she was not held hostage and was 
free to seek protection in other ways. (R v Wang [1990], pp. 535 and 539) 
The case file material provided a much fuller background of what was happening in 
the relationship and the extent to which Mrs Wang really had other realistic 
possibilities to prevent the harm that she perceived, including telling her friends. The 
Court was indeed satisfied that a jury could find that she honestly believed she had 
no other option but to kill him: 
Turning now to consider the circumstances as the applicant believed them to be, it is 
not in dispute, as found by the trial Judge, that there was material from which the 
jury could infer that the accused's view of the circumstances was that she, or 
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members of her family, were under threat of being harmed by her husband whether 
physically or otherwise. Furthermore there was the evidence of the psychiatrist that 
the applicant would have believed that the threats of her husband would be carried 
through. There was also his evidence that in the state she was in, the only course 
she could think of was to kill her husband. (R v Wang [1990], p. 534) 
The facts missing from the Court of Appeal’s account of the evidence goes directly to 
the issue of whether she believed that her husband would carry out the threats to kill 
and what reasonable options she had to avoid those threats. This information, which 
can be seen as altering the framing of the objective limb of section 48 of the Crimes 
Act 1961 (NZ), remained, until now, hidden from public view and therefore could not 
add weight to the many calls for reform. It has been left to the feminist judge writing 
in 2017 to draw a different conclusion from that reached 28 years previously: 
On the evidence, it would not be impossible for a jury to entertain a reasonable doubt 
as to whether Mrs Wang was acting in self-defence. Mrs Wang honestly believed that 
her husband would carry out his threats to kill or cause serious injury to herself and 
her family. She was a Chinese immigrant to New Zealand, she was suffering from a 
major depressive illness, she lived within a coercive relationship, was socially isolated 
and did not believe she had any other avenues to escape her husband. She gave 
evidence that he made all the decisions and she was not even to use the phone 
without his permission. She said she knew she could not leave him as he would never 
let her go, and he made threats against her life on a daily basis. As was observed by 
both the trial Judge and the majority, Mrs Wang was socially isolated and not aware 
of avenues for help. It is paradoxical, at the least, to then suggest she did have 
options available to her. Furthermore, she lived with Mr Li – she knew better than 
anyone what Mr Li was capable of and whether he could carry through with his 
threats. Although he was asleep when he was killed, Mrs Wang honestly believed he 
could have woken at any time and carried out his threats. In those circumstances, it 
was necessary and proportionate to tie him up and kill him, before he followed 
through on his threats to kill her or her family.  
Applying the law in this way is not a return to the law of the jungle, as Eichelbaum J 
put it. Rather it is giving due weight to the subjective element of s 48 which requires 
that the accused honestly believes there is a threat of serious harm. If Mrs Wang had 
not taken those steps to defend herself and others, it is highly plausible that they 
would have been on the receiving end of serious violence. (Midson 2017) 
Accessing the court file in Wang allowed the feminist judge to add greater factual 
context to her decision, context which was minimised by the trial Judge and the Court 
of Appeal. The additional facts allowed for a fuller, more visible, story to be told about 
the experiences of Wang Xiao Jing, and also exposed the limitations of the statutory 
interpretation exercise undertaken by both courts. As Rosemary Hunter observes in 
relation to the task of feminist judging: 
[O]ne of the persistent obstacles to the success of feminist law reforms has been the 
fact that once enacted, legislation must be implemented by judges and officials who 
are often uninformed about or actively unsympathetic to its objectives. A feminist 
judge is in a position to implement feminist-inspired law reform in the way it was 
intended to operate... 
[T]he facts are at least as important as the law. ‘Facts’ are not given but constructed, 
and very often the feminist judge begins by telling the story differently from the way 
it has been told by the other judges—emphasising different aspects of the narrative, 
paying greater attention to voices and experiences which have been traditionally 
silenced or side-lined, acknowledging the harm and trauma suffered by protagonists, 
or, indeed, restoring dignity and privacy to a party by not retelling their traumatic 
experience in exhaustive detail. Sometimes the different story provides the basis for 
a different analysis and application of the law. Sometimes it is simply important in 
itself that a different account is given. (Hunter et al. 2017, citations omitted) 
Presenting and emphasising facts in a different way may well lead to a different 
outcome, but may also simply acknowledge and validate a woman’s version of events 
or her lived reality. As Rhonda Powell discusses, feminist methodology is also about 
listening to, hearing and reflecting on women’s stories: 
Elisabeth McDonald and Paulette Benton-Greig   Accessing Court Files as… 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 8, n. 9 (2018), 1241-1258 
ISSN: 2079-5971 1248 
The way in which a judge tells the story that led to a court case has the effect of 
solidifying the particular narrative adopted by the judge. If the judge ignores certain 
details deemed to be legally irrelevant, those details are lost from the story. The way 
in which a judge constructs and interprets the facts of a case becomes a legal ‘truth’. 
One of the ways in which a judge can be ‘feminist’ is by listening to women’s stories, 
hearing the perspectives of woman litigants and recognising women’s experiences in 
the way that they recount the facts of cases, so that these experiences also become 
legal truths. 
This technique could be seen to relate to the process of judgment-writing rather than 
the outcome of the case. However, the way in which the facts are framed may also 
influence the reasoning and thereby the outcome. The way in which a judge tells the 
story of the case also plays a potentially therapeutic role for the parties, even if the 
outcome is disappointing. Sensitive use of language has the potential to enhance the 
mana of people involved in the proceedings, which is especially important for those 
who have been treated inhumanely already. (Hunter et al. 2017, citations omitted) 
In the context of sexual offending, complainants often only hear the verdict at the 
end of the trial, which, for many, is a harrowing, foreign and deeply distressing 
experience. In judge-alone trials, rare in the context of offending against adults, a 
complainant will be given the reasons for the verdict, and consequently may know 
that the judge did believe them that they did not consent, even while finding the 
defendant not guilty. What remains invisible in jury trials is the fact-finding process, 
as well as the grounds for admissibility decisions, unless they are the subject of 
appeal. Although research into jury decision-making is uncommon (but see Law 
Commission 2001a), access to court files allows greater scrutiny of unreported factual 
and legal analysis as well as information about support given to complainants during 
the trial process. Our current rape trial research therefore allows us to make more 
visible the decisions and the decision-making process in that context, which are also 
based on factual analysis and assessments of the complainant’s story (evidence). In 
the next part of this piece, we briefly outline our methodology and then give two 
examples of what access to court files tells us. 
3. Hearing and protecting the complainant: Court file access methodology 
Despite forty years of legislative and procedural change in rape trials in New Zealand 
(McDonald 2014)1, adult complainants still report high levels of dissatisfaction with 
the court process, in particular cross-examination, the type of questioning which has 
been most resistant to reform initiatives [Gender Bias and the Law Project 1996, 
McDonald 1997b, Bacik et al. 1998, Konradi 2007, Doak 2008, ACT Government 
2009, Kingi and Jordan 2009, Payne 2009, Parkes 2017, but see Kebbell et al. 2007]. 
Complainant description of their experiences show little change between the Rape 
Study in 1983 (Young 1983) and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (as it then was) 
funded research published in 2009 (Kingi and Jordan 2009). There is limited analysis 
of whether the thoughtful and innovative reforms recommended by the New Zealand 
Law Commission in their 1999 draft Evidence Code, largely in force from 1 August 
2007 in the form of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZ), have been applied as intended.  
The internationally accepted impact of cultural constructions of gendered sexuality2 
on trial process and outcomes has resulted in local conversations about alternatives 
to criminal prosecution (Law Commission 2015), but very little challenge to the 
adversarial process, and the nature of cross-examination in particular. Only one 
                                                 
1 In New Zealand section 128 Crimes Act 1961 defines sexual violation and differentiates between sexual 
violation by rape, being the penetration of a person’s genitalia by a penis, and sexual violation by unlawful 
sexual connection which includes penetration by body part or object of, or oral connection with, a person’s 
genitalia or anus. 
2 Or in the alternative called rape myths. We understand both phrases to refer to the false beliefs about 
rape and rape victims that are pervasive in society. Martha Burt first described rape myths as “prejudicial, 
stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists” (Burt 1980, p. 217). More recently they 
have been described as “descriptive or prescriptive beliefs about sexual aggression (i.e., about its scope, 
causes, context, and consequences) that serve to deny, downplay or justify sexually aggressive behavior 
that men commit against women” (Gerger et al. 2007, p. 423). 
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recommendation from the evidence law analysis in From “Real Rape” to Real Justice 
(McDonald and Tinsley 2011) has been implemented.3 Despite the flurry of research 
and policy work over the last ten years, following the criticism of the handling of a 
number of historical rape allegations (Nicholas 2007, Tolmie 2012), there has been 
very little real change to the way adult rape complainants experience going to court 
(Bazley 2007, Law Commission 2008, Ministry of Justice 2008, Kingi and Jordan 
2009, Mossman et al. 2009a, 2009b, Triggs et al., 2009, Taskforce for Action on 
Sexual Violence 2009, McDonald and Tinsley 2011, Parkes 2017). 
The overall aim of our research project, with the working title Rape myths as barriers 
to fair trial process,4 is to find better ways of testing the evidence of rape 
complainants by producing new knowledge of rape trial process and the extent to 
which current law and practice impede fair process and just outcomes. We believe 
that research grounded in an analysis of what actually happens in court provides the 
strongest foundation for change proposals. By investigating language, discourse and 
interaction in the courtroom, our research aims to produce original insights into the 
subtle ways that rape myths operate at trial. The questioning of the complainant 
during cross-examination is a focus because it is the aspect of court proceedings that 
has been most widely criticised, and has been largely immune from the decades of 
law reform. We aim to describe and critique how rape myth and questioning structure 
function to undermine a complainant’s credibility, attribute blame to her and construe 
the sexual activity as consensual. The work will also provide a contemporary overview 
of what is happening regarding the admission and use of complainant evidence in 
rape cases – especially the application of the current rules of evidence. Such work 
will be of assistance for judicial training and future reform initiatives, including the 
Law Commission’s second review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZ), due for completion 
in March 2019. 
There are several parts to this research, all which required access to court records. 
Our funding allows analysis of 30 jury trials which involved an allegation by a woman 
of rape by a single male defendant held between 1 January 2010 and 30 September 
2015. The cases involve adult complainants who had some kind of social contact – 
but were not in an intimate or kin relationship – with the defendant and the defence 
at trial centres on consent. Research shows that complainants experience the most 
difficult time at trial when the issues are consent or belief in consent, which typically 
occurs in “acquaintance rape” scenarios (McDonald 1997b).  
In each case, we obtained audio records and transcripts of the complainant’s 
evidence, the closing arguments and the jury directions pursuant to the access rules 
in place at the time: Rule 6.9 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2012 (NZ). Other parts 
of the court file were also accessed on site to gather information from the case that 
might impact on the content and form of the complainant’s evidence – for example, 
pre-trial rulings which may have impacted on the complainant’s evidence (regarding 
mode of evidence), any relevant admissibility decisions, other information about the 
defence that is offered pre-trial or at trial, and any agreed statements of fact.  
Access to the audio recordings of the complainant’s evidence is the significant and 
unique aspect of this research. We sought the audio recordings of complainant 
evidence in order to be able to capture in-court interactions with the complainant, 
which are not transcribed as it is not evidence. We wanted to know how complainants 
are treated and responded to during their time in the courtroom and if that could be 
improved in any way. We also wanted to listen to the complainant’s testimony in 
order to gather information about tone, emotionality and trouble during questioning. 
                                                 
3 Section 44A came into force on 8 January 2017 and requires that a written application be made to seek 
leave of the Judge to offer evidence or ask a question about the sexual experience of the complainant with 
a person other than the defendant; previously the permission of the Judge was required (See Tautu v R 
[2017] and McDonald and Tinsley 2013, p. 769, Law Commission 2015). 
4 The research is supported by the Marsden Fund Council from Government funding, managed by Royal 
Society Te Apārangi, and by the University of Canterbury. 
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What can changes in the vocal tone or emotional register of the complainant tell us 
about which aspects of questioning are the most difficult for complainants? We 
wanted to be able to hear response and affect to understand more about how 
complainants themselves responded to the nature, style and progression of 
questioning, rather than make assumptions based on our reading of text. Lastly, the 
audio recording can also be used to augment the notes of evidence which do not 
include various evidential and procedural submissions made during trial that may be 
relevant to the use of evidence and complainant experience.  
Another primary focus of our work is the characterisation of rape and rape victims by 
counsel and judiciary. Some of these characterisations occur during questioning of 
the complainant, but they also occur during statements to the jury, particularly when 
the parties are summarising their case immediately prior to jury deliberations. We 
therefore also sought access to the closing statements of the prosecution and 
defence, and to the jury directions which allow analysis of the way consent is defined. 
Access to these court records, not normally available, has clearly demonstrated how 
the day- to-day workings of the courtroom impact on complainants’ experiences of 
seeking justice. Below we offer two examples. In the first, analysis of the notes of 
the complainant’s evidence revealed the extent to which evidence about the 
complainant’s occupation was being admitted, contrary to section 88 of the Evidence 
Act 2006 (NZ) which requires that such evidence must pass a heightened relevance 
test. Section 88 is intended to protect the privacy of complainants in sex crimes trials 
and should help protect their psychological safety, but is being commonly 
disregarded. In the second, the audio recordings of the complainants’ evidence 
allowed us to hear all the verbal interactions that happened at trial but were not 
recorded in the notes of evidence. We used this material to gather information about 
how complainants were communicated with and responded to by judges during their 
time in the courtroom. Our analysis shows significant variation in the tone and 
amount of judicial communication with the complainant and demonstrates why some 
complainants still – despite increasing education for judges and changing courtroom 
culture – feel like exhibits in the trial of their rape.  
3.1. Disclosing the complainant’s occupation: Application of the law   
A comprehensive study of the law and practice in rape trials, which included 
interviews with adult complainants and case file analysis, led to significant reforms 
which came into effect 1 February 1986 (Young 1983). One of the aims of the 
package of reforms was to ameliorate some of the distressing impacts of giving 
evidence and to control the use and admission of irrelevant and character-blackening 
material. In addressing concerns about the privacy of the complainants, the 1986 
reforms introduced the requirement that the court be closed while the complainant 
gives evidence and that “[n]o oral evidence shall be given, and no question shall be 
put to a witness, relating to the address or occupation of the complainant except by 
leave of the Judge” (section 23AA(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1908 (NZ)). In order for 
evidence of address and occupation to be admitted, the judge must be “satisfied that 
the evidence to be given or the question to be put is of such direct relevance to facts 
in issue that to exclude it would be contrary to the interests of justice” (section 
23AA(3)). Section 87 of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZ) (coming into effect 1 August 
2007) extended the control of information about a person’s address to all 
proceedings, and section 88 re-enacted the admissibility rule regarding evidence of 
the occupation of a complainant in a sexual case. Its current form is: 
88 Restriction on disclosure of complainant’s occupation in sexual cases 
(1) In a sexual case, except with the permission of the Judge,— 
(a) no question may be put to the complainant or any other witness, and no evidence 
may be given, concerning the complainant’s occupation; and 
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(b) no statement or remark may be made in court by a witness, lawyer, officer of the 
court, or any other person involved in the proceeding concerning the complainant’s 
occupation. 
(2) The Judge must not grant permission under subsection (1) unless satisfied that 
the question to be put, the evidence to be given, or the statement or remark to be 
made, is of sufficient direct relevance to the facts in issue that to exclude it would be 
contrary to the interests of justice. 
(3) An application for permission under subsection (1) may be made before or after 
the commencement of any hearing, and is, where practicable, to be made and dealt 
with in chambers. 
Despite the rule controlling disclosure of complainant occupation having been in force 
for 24 years prior to the first cases in our study, our analysis of the court file 
transcripts demonstrates that the well-intentioned reform is having little effect in 
adult acquaintance rape cases. In 17 of the 30 cases the complainant was asked 
about her occupation, or whether she was in employment or studying. In only one of 
these cases did this question occur in cross-examination – in all other cases the 
complainant was asked about her occupation by the prosecutor as one of the first of 
the questions in the complainant’s examination-in-chief.  
Based on our reading of the complainant’s evidence and our understanding of the 
defence arguments, evidence of occupation may have met the threshold for 
admissibility in five of the 17 cases. These were cases in which the complainant and 
the defendant either worked together or the complainant met the defendant through 
a work colleague. However, with the exception of one case in which the offending 
took place on a work site and involved other co-workers as witnesses, the actual 
details of the nature of the complainant’s occupation need not have been disclosed 
in order for the full narrative of the alleged offending to be presented and understood. 
In a number of cases the complainant was unemployed at the time of the trial, which 
may transpire to be a relevant factor in terms of her ability to call a taxi to get home 
or avoid the defendant, but in our view it is not a necessary question to ask so early 
in the complainant’s evidence. Being required to give such an answer at a stage when 
the complainant is no doubt feeling anxious in an unfamiliar courtroom environment, 
and may well be embarrassed about her employment status, will not assist her 
comfort levels, and is contrary to the law. 
In a recent High Court case, not in our sample, the judge was asked to consider 
whether evidence about the complainant using money from her welfare benefit to 
buy methamphetamine was admissible, with the prosecution specifically referring to 
section 88 (as well as to the rules concerning self-incrimination). In R v Morgan 
[2016] Palmer J held that being a beneficiary is not an “occupation” for the purposes 
of section 88. However, he stated, “there is a privacy interest in that status”. In this 
case the source of the complainant’s money (with which she allegedly purchased 
methamphetamine) was irrelevant. The fact that the complainant was a beneficiary 
was therefore inadmissible. We agree with this analysis. 
There is one case in our research in which it is clear that the judge was asked to rule 
on the admissibility of evidence of the complainant’s occupation. This was at the 
request of the defence, who sought to ask the complainant her occupation during 
cross-examination and the prosecutor objected. After an in-chambers discussion, in 
which the judge expressed some surprise at the scope of section 88, the judge ruled 
that the complainant may be asked about her occupation as it is has relevance to 
consent and the defendant’s belief in consent (the issues in the trial). The defence 
argument, accepted by the judge, was that as the complainant was in a management 
position at the time, she would be able to clearly communicate to others, including 
to the defendant if she were not consenting to sexual activity. In our view, the 
evidence of her occupation did not meet the heightened relevance test in section 88 
and should not have been admitted.  
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Our preliminary analysis of the current operation of the rules of evidence in 
acquaintance rape trials has exposed that a long-standing rule introduced for the 
purpose of complainant protection is being ignored in practice. Prosecutors asked the 
complainant about their occupation in more than half of the 30 cases in our sample, 
and in nearly all those cases the evidence should not have been admitted. Judges did 
not comment on the irrelevancy of that information or ask the jury to disregard it, 
even when the complainant appeared to be in some distress after having to disclose 
they were not working or were a 18 year old “stay at home mum” on a benefit. Not 
only is this personal information not relevant, in the New Zealand cultural context 
these are also stigmatised societal identifiers that might evoke shame in 
complainants and stereotyped bias in jurors. Prosecutors may be using these types 
of questions to ease the complainant into the questioning process, but they ignore 
the lived realities of complainants and the power relations of the courtroom, 
potentially exacerbating complainant’s experiences of “being the one on trial” (Kingi 
and Jordan 2009, Parkes 2017).  
The notes of evidence (trial transcripts) showed up this aspect of problematic 
courtroom practice, but as we discovered, the audio recordings of the complainant 
evidence brought to light other aspects. We discuss below one such example: judicial 
communication with the complainant.           
3.2. Judicial communication with the complainant 
In order to analyse the information that the audio recordings provided, we produced 
verbatim transcripts of what was spoken in court, including notable paralinguistic 
features and sounds that indicated heightened emotionality. The spoken material that 
was added to the transcripts comprised all speech that was spoken to be heard by 
the judge, counsel or the complainant which related to the complainant’s evidence 
and which was not already on the transcript or which had been abbreviated for the 
transcript. This included judicial communication for the purposes of managing the 
courtroom or the trial process; judicial communication with the complainant or 
counsel in relation to the complainant; counsel communication with the complainant; 
interjection during questioning; evidential argument and rulings while the court is in 
chambers; and, speech that gave us information about mode of evidence or relevant 
trial procedure aspects of complainant testimony.  
This annotation of the official trial notes of evidence with the complete verbal and 
paralinguistic in-court and in-chambers interactions from the audio recording has 
produced anonymised editable transcripts of the complainant’s evidence. This was a 
very time consuming, but essential, task that illuminates much about day-to-day trial 
practice and complainant experience of giving evidence in acquaintance rape trials. 
At this point in the research we are able to make some initial observations about 
judicial interaction with the complainant, which is only possible due to the availability 
of the audio records, and the annotation of the transcripts which exposes when, why 
and how the judge talks directly to the complainant. 
The annotated transcripts revealed significant variation in the amount and manner of 
communication from the judge to the complainant. That variation fell along a 
spectrum from very little communication—less than 0.3% of talk—to quite active 
engagement in complainant testimony, at 10% of words spoken. Within that 
spectrum we observed three broad groups. In some trials, approximately a quarter, 
judges communicated with the complainant in the third person: ‘I allow the witness 
to stand down’ or only to give brief instruction on required process. That might 
include requests to speak up for the audio recording, overnight warnings, or standing 
down the witness. As the following example demonstrates, in these cases, even when 
judicial communication with the complainant occurred, it was nonetheless minimal in 
content and distancing in effect: “[Prosecutor]: I ask that the witness be allowed to 
go free. Judge: Alright. Thank you. You are now free to go”. In this group of trials, 
much of what the complainant needed to know was communicated through other 
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people, and this often happened in hushed and hurried tones, as if talking to the 
complainant was improper or forbidden.  
In the largest group, comprised of a little under half of the trials, judges spoke more 
fulsomely to the complainant as part of managing trial conduct, including instructions 
about what to do and when, such as reading from interview transcripts or 
arrangements during adjournments. These judges made some effort to explain what 
was happening, or might have spoken to the complainant by asking clarifying 
questions during testimony, but their communication with the complainant was 
nonetheless mostly limited to instruction and information giving.  
In the remaining quarter of trials, judges did more to communicate with complainants 
in ways that in our view would have supported their well-being while in court, and 
may well have assisted them to give their best evidence. In this group of trials, judges 
communicated with complainants so as to increase their comfort, humanise the 
courtroom experience, provide information about what would happen in advance, and 
give reassurance to distressed or emotionally impacted complainants. 
Research with people who have been complainants in sex crimes trials has 
consistently documented their experience of giving evidence in court as one of 
isolation and spectacle; disempowerment and irrelevancy (Gender Bias and the Law 
Project 1996, McDonald 1997, Bacik et al. 1998, Konradi 2007, ACT Government 
2009, Kingi and Jordan 2009, Payne 2009). Fuller, respectful communication from 
the judge does not of course fundamentally alter the experience of cross-
examination, but it might convey that the safeguards and limits set by practice and 
legislation will be enforced and go some way toward assuring the complainant that 
her evidence was of value to the court.  
We were struck by the ability of court records to illuminate why some complainants 
describe feeling like objects on display while giving evidence in rape trials. Despite 
some cultural change and improvement in process to assist complainants to feel more 
comfortable and valuable at trial, the more traditional practices are still in use and 
more could be done in most trials. But much more will become apparent from this 
research – a unique and timely feminist contribution – and one that we hope will 
result in real change to the experience of complainants in rape trials.  
4. Conclusion 
Feminist judgment writing, as a feminist endeavour, demonstrates the significance 
of hearing women’s stories. Feminist judges reimagining decisions may also 
undertake a factual analysis that results in an outcome consistent with legislative 
intent (see e.g. Benton-Greig 2017) or, as importantly, acknowledges that a woman’s 
reality needs to be portrayed in a way that is consistent with her experience and the 
evidence that is offered in court. 
During the Feminist Judgments Project Aotearoa, access to the court file in Wang 
[1990] exposed absence or missing relevant facts in the appellate decision. These 
facts supported the evidence of Mrs Wang that she honestly, and reasonably, believed 
she had no alternative but to kill her husband at that time. While the Court of Appeal 
agreed with the trial judge, who withheld self-defence from the jury, that she had 
alternatives, failing to understand the significance of the context and history of 
threats and abuse meant that Mrs Wang was not heard. Her story was never fully 
reflected in the decision or in the verdict. 
Similar absences of women’s stories within the criminal justice system occur regularly 
in the context of rape trials, where, in the absence of an appeal, the decisions and 
the verdict are invisible, despite the significant impact on the complainant. In our 
rape trial research, access to court records, including to the complainant’s evidence 
and the response of the judge to her as a person, are made visible. We are also able 
to document the extent to which advocate-led evidence law reforms, enacted to offer 
increased protection for complainants, are actually working in practice. With regard 
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to the bar on the disclosure of information about the complainant’s occupation, a rule 
now of 32 years standing, it is clear that counsel and the judiciary need to apply it in 
all cases. In this research, therefore, and in the feminist judgments global work, we 
continue to see the significance of accessing and critiquing the decision-making 
process.  
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